Title: Evolutionary game analysis of emission reduction strategies between port and shipping enterprises and shippers under carbon trading mechanism

Authors: Jing Liang; Lin Zhang; Yuying Dou

Addresses: School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China ' School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China ' School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China

Abstract: Adopting a supply chain perspective, an evolutionary game model is constructed to investigate the carbon reduction game dynamics between port and shipping enterprises and shippers. Through numerical simulations, we explore the factors influencing carbon reduction decisions for both these enterprises and shippers. The results indicate that as carbon trading prices rise, port and shipping enterprises show an accelerated propensity towards emission reduction. Given the anticipated significant increase in carbon trading prices in the future, these enterprises might opt for emission reduction at the very onset of their decision-making process. For the entire supply chain, it is recommended that the government amplify its subsidy intensity for shippers while maintaining the subsidy for port and shipping enterprises within a certain range. Additionally, a moderate reduction in the charges for carbon reduction services by port and shipping enterprises proves effective in promoting their emission reductions and enticing shippers to avail of these services.

Keywords: emission reduction strategies; evolutionary game theory; carbon emissions trading mechanism.

DOI: 10.1504/IJSTL.2024.144022

International Journal of Shipping and Transport Logistics, 2024 Vol.19 No.4, pp.505 - 524

Received: 06 Nov 2023
Accepted: 10 Jan 2024
Published online: 21 Jan 2025 *

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