Executive pay: must ''winner-take-all'' mean that shareholders lose out?
by Carmen Alpin, J.R. Shackleton
International Journal of Business Performance Management (IJBPM), Vol. 2, No. 4, 2000

Abstract: This paper reviews the evidence on the rapid growth of top executive pay in the UK. It links this to developments in other countries, notably the USA, and examines various theoretical approaches to the determination of executive compensation. The authors argue that the popular belief (derived from principal-agent theory) that executive pay should be linked closely to performance is too simplistic. Policy proposals to reform corporate governance cannot be justified on these grounds.

Online publication date: Thu, 10-Apr-2003

The full text of this article is only available to individual subscribers or to users at subscribing institutions.

 
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.

Pay per view:
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.

Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Business Performance Management (IJBPM):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:

Username:        Password:          Forgotten your password?

Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.

If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com