Forthcoming articles


International Journal of Economics and Accounting


These articles have been peer-reviewed and accepted for publication in IJEA, but are pending final changes, are not yet published and may not appear here in their final order of publication until they are assigned to issues. Therefore, the content conforms to our standards but the presentation (e.g. typesetting and proof-reading) is not necessarily up to the Inderscience standard. Additionally, titles, authors, abstracts and keywords may change before publication. Articles will not be published until the final proofs are validated by their authors.


Forthcoming articles must be purchased for the purposes of research, teaching and private study only. These articles can be cited using the expression "in press". For example: Smith, J. (in press). Article Title. Journal Title.


Articles marked with this shopping trolley icon are available for purchase - click on the icon to send an email request to purchase.


Articles marked with this Open Access icon are freely available and openly accessible to all without any restriction except the ones stated in their respective CC licenses.


Register for our alerting service, which notifies you by email when new issues of IJEA are published online.


We also offer RSS feeds which provide timely updates of tables of contents, newly published articles and calls for papers.


International Journal of Economics and Accounting (3 papers in press)


Regular Issues


  • PUBLIC UTILITIES   Order a copy of this article
    by Tony Tinker 
    Abstract: How are the prices of utility charges for its services determined? Utility's rates are set on a cost-plus-profit basis. The profit is decided by using the regulated profit % to the amount that a firm invested in assets that produce the services; this investment is termed led the rate base). The regulated profit percentage is usually set at a level that will give the company at return on its investment that is termed the rate base. There are extensive differences between states in how each defines the rate base and in what constitute an allowable expense for rate setting purposes, although the general procedure des
    Keywords: Public utilities; companies; economic theory; income; tax.

  • Is there a Lock-in Effect of Corporate Capital Gains Taxation? Evidence from the German Market   Order a copy of this article
    by Silke Rünger 
    Abstract: The existence of a so-called lock-in effect, a phenomena where individuals defer the disposal of an asset in order to avoid capital gains taxes, is well documented in empirical tax research. There is no empirical evidence, however, on whether this effect also occurs if assets are held by corporations rather than individuals. This paper uses a unique tax reform, the repeal of the German corporate capital gains tax on disposals of equity holdings in 2002, to test for the existence of a lock-in effect of corporate capital gains taxation. I apply a difference-in-difference approach and evaluate the effects of the repeal on the disposal behavior of German firms. My results, based on an analysis of 655 corporate equity holdings over the period 1999-2005, show an immediate and widespread reaction by German firms to the repeal of the capital gains taxation in the year 2002 and therefore show evidence of a severe lock-in effect. My findings contribute to better understanding of the lock-in effect of corporate capital gains taxation. They can also help policymakers to identify the possible effects of any changes in corporate capital gains taxation on disposal behavior of firms.
    Keywords: corporate capital gains; lock-in effect; taxation; Germany.

  • Signals of Ability in an Agency Model   Order a copy of this article
    by Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich, Vinay Ramani 
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the tradeoffs associated with relying on performance versus ability measures in executive compensation. We propose a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection in which the principal designs the compensation scheme to be contingent on the outcome of interest to the principal along with a noisy signal of the agent's ability. The signal of ability may include traditional measures of human capital, and information gleaned from private interactions with the agent. We show that, under empirically plausible conditions, the weight placed on the signal of ability is negative, while the weight placed on the outcome is positive; and an increase in one weight tends to be associated with a reduction in the other weight. Consequently, the principal may in fact prefer agents with inferior qualifications, rejecting those who are ``overqualified''; conversely, she may select an agent with a distinguished pedigree, rejecting agents who are ``underqualified''.
    Keywords: Screening; Ability; Effort; Compensation; Pay-Performance Sensitivity.