Compensation preferences of R&D-suppliers: some empirical results Online publication date: Mon, 12-Nov-2007
by Martin Kloyer, Roland Helm, Wolfgang Burr
International Journal of Technology Management (IJTM), Vol. 40, No. 4, 2007
Abstract: R&D suppliers who are not compensated according to their preferences are motivated to behave opportunistically. The paper presents empirical findings about these preferences. The investigation is based on the assumption that the probability of a continuous compensation, instead of a final payment, increases when the negotiation power of the supplier rises. The results confirm this presumption with regard to the power determinants of effective intellectual property rights and the number of cooperation alternatives. In contrast to that, suppliers, who control the complementary assets themselves, have no explicit preference.
Online publication date: Mon, 12-Nov-2007
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