Authors: Martin Kloyer, Roland Helm, Wolfgang Burr
Addresses: Industrial Management, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Carl-Zeib-Strabe 3, D 07743 Jena, Germany. ' Unilever-Chair of Marketing and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Carl-Zeib-Strabe 3, D 07743 Jena, Germany. ' Chair of Technology and Innovation Management, University of Stuttgart, Heilbronner Str. 7, D 70174 Stuttgart, Germany
Abstract: R&D suppliers who are not compensated according to their preferences are motivated to behave opportunistically. The paper presents empirical findings about these preferences. The investigation is based on the assumption that the probability of a continuous compensation, instead of a final payment, increases when the negotiation power of the supplier rises. The results confirm this presumption with regard to the power determinants of effective intellectual property rights and the number of cooperation alternatives. In contrast to that, suppliers, who control the complementary assets themselves, have no explicit preference.
Keywords: contract R&D; research and development; supplier opportunism; compensation preferences; negotiation power; resource dependence theory; continuous compensation; suppliers; cooperation; intellectual property rights; IPR.
International Journal of Technology Management, 2007 Vol.40 No.4, pp.371 - 387
Published online: 12 Nov 2007 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article