Popular fallacy: a public choice analysis of Electoral College reform
by Brandon Marc Draper
International Journal of Public Law and Policy (IJPLAP), Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011

Abstract: This article contends that the demand for Electoral College reform that occurs during every US presidential election season, most notably after the 2000 presidential election controversy, is largely misguided. Individuals demanding reform mainly seek to replace the Electoral College with an election system that, unlike the Electoral College, guarantees that the winner earns the most national popular votes. However, public choice provides a unique framework for assessing the inherent flaws of these reforms against the Electoral College. This article, under a public choice analysis, will seek to explain the deficiencies of the Electoral College, but more importantly, explain why reforms to or the abolishment of the Electoral College may either fail to solve US presidential election problems or even exacerbate them.

Online publication date: Tue, 31-Mar-2015

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