Title: Popular fallacy: a public choice analysis of Electoral College reform

Authors: Brandon Marc Draper

Addresses: 56 Genova Court, Farmingdale, New York, 11735, USA

Abstract: This article contends that the demand for Electoral College reform that occurs during every US presidential election season, most notably after the 2000 presidential election controversy, is largely misguided. Individuals demanding reform mainly seek to replace the Electoral College with an election system that, unlike the Electoral College, guarantees that the winner earns the most national popular votes. However, public choice provides a unique framework for assessing the inherent flaws of these reforms against the Electoral College. This article, under a public choice analysis, will seek to explain the deficiencies of the Electoral College, but more importantly, explain why reforms to or the abolishment of the Electoral College may either fail to solve US presidential election problems or even exacerbate them.

Keywords: US Electoral College; United States; USA; electoral colleges; public choice; compulsory voting; Kenneth Arrow; impossibility theorems; general possibility theorem; Condorcet efficiency; median voter theorem; nirvana fallacy; plurality rule; Congressional District Method; National Popular Vote; voting plans; direct elections; instant-runoff voting; IRV; alternative vote; AV; ranked choice voting; votes; voters; voting systems; National Bonus Plan; popular fallacies; electoral reforms; presidential elections; US presidents; 2000 election; election controversies; democracy; public law; public policy.

DOI: 10.1504/IJPLAP.2011.041890

International Journal of Public Law and Policy, 2011 Vol.1 No.1, pp.49 - 82

Received: 08 May 2021
Accepted: 12 May 2021

Published online: 15 Aug 2011 *

Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article