Title: Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities under price competition of terminal operators
Authors: Hsiao-Chi Chen; Yen-Hung Lin; Shi-Miin Liu
Addresses: Department of Economics, National Taipei University, New Taipei City, 23741, Taiwan ' Department of Economics, National Taipei University, New Taipei City, 23741, Taiwan ' Department of Economics, National Taipei University, New Taipei City, 23741, Taiwan
Abstract: This paper extends Chen and Liu's (2014) study by assuming that terminal operators compete in prices, instead of in quantities. Under this setting, the paper shows that the two-part tariff contract is the port authority's best choice. In addition, the paper refines the outcomes of Chen and Liu (2014) by showing that the two-part tariff contract, rather than the unit-fee contract, is the optimal choice for the port authority if the marginal service costs of the less efficient operator are small. The results presented here and Chen and Liu (2014) imply that the two-part tariff contract is the best solution for landlord port authorities under different competing modes and cost structures of terminal operators, as well as under various service differentiation levels of the operators. The port authority and the more efficient operator may prefer price or quantity competition. Terminal operators' service differentiation levels and their marginal service costs will determine the results. However, the less efficient operator will always prefer quantity to price competition if it survives in the market.
Keywords: concession contracts; fixed fee contracts; landlord port authorities; price competition; quantity competition; terminal operators; two-part tariff contracts; unit fee contracts; optimisation; service differentiation; service costs; marginal costs.
International Journal of Shipping and Transport Logistics, 2017 Vol.9 No.2, pp.131 - 165
Available online: 14 Jan 2017 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article