Title: 'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation

Authors: Yannick Perez

Addresses: ADIS-GRJM, Universite de Paris-Sud 11, 91405 Orsay cedex, Paris, France

Abstract: In the early 1990s, Pablo Spiller worked on North and Williamson|s application of the New Institutional Economics, on the conditions of credible network reforms. Credibility is defined as the capacity to provide reform commitments. This work, started from a Positive Political Economics Veto Point Model, has been constructed and applied with good results. The Author will show the consequences of the |credibility as a trade off| concept in the efficiency of Regulatory Instruments studied and then introduce two improvements. Self-Regulation is introduced and their performance reconsidered in order to achieve the trade off between commitment and flexibility.

Keywords: credibility; electricity sector; reform; new institutional economics; network reforms; trade off; regulatory instruments; self-regulation; commitment; flexibility.

DOI: 10.1504/GBER.2005.007621

Global Business and Economics Review, 2005 Vol.7 No.2/3, pp.278 - 291

Published online: 20 Aug 2005 *

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