Title: Cartel-fringe models of the oil market: a quantitative assessment
Authors: Alex Halsema; Cees Withagen
Addresses: Centre for World Food Studies, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. ' Department of Spatial Economics, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract: This paper provides a quantitative analysis of different equilibrium concepts employed in the literature on the cartel-fringe models. It is shown that small changes in parameter values can greatly affect outcomes due to changes in extraction schedules. Furthermore, it is shown that results of the closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium are often closer to the results of the open-loop Nash equilibrium than to those of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
Keywords: non-renewable resources; cartels; cartel-fringe models; oil markets; Nash equilibrium; John Forbes Nash; solution concepts; game theory; Stackelberg leadership model; strategic games; economics; Heinrich von Stackelberg; market structures; market equilibrium; competition; equilibrium concepts; parameter values; outcomes; extraction schedules; closed-loop equilibrium; open-loop equilibrium; technology management; environment; business; sustainability; sustainable development.
International Journal of Technology Management, 2012 Vol.60 No.1/2, pp.60 - 82
Published online: 06 Apr 2013 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article