Cartel-fringe models of the oil market: a quantitative assessment
by Alex Halsema; Cees Withagen
International Journal of Technology Management (IJTM), Vol. 60, No. 1/2, 2012

Abstract: This paper provides a quantitative analysis of different equilibrium concepts employed in the literature on the cartel-fringe models. It is shown that small changes in parameter values can greatly affect outcomes due to changes in extraction schedules. Furthermore, it is shown that results of the closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium are often closer to the results of the open-loop Nash equilibrium than to those of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.

Online publication date: Sat, 06-Apr-2013

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