Title: Is game theory a useful tool for terrorism insurance?

Authors: Stefano Gori, Marzia Kanti Donatella Padrone

Addresses: PhD student Economics, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK and Via Mar Glaciale Artico 16, 00122 Rome, Italy. ' Italian Civil Servant, Via San Godenzo 79, 00189 Rome, Italy

Abstract: This paper addresses the topic of terrorism insurance. Financial markets and international institutions believe that terrorism risk modelling falls short of making the likelihood of future attacks more predictable and quantifiable. We present the literature of research in the domain of game theory applied to terrorism insurance, we scrutinise the possibility of using evolutionary game theory and we put forward the theoretical and practical issues that need to be addressed before reaching a satisfactory modelling framework to be used by the sector.

Keywords: game theory; government co-insurance; imperfect information; terrorism insurance; terrorism risks; risk modelling; risk assessment; future attacks.

DOI: 10.1504/IJRAM.2007.015300

International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, 2007 Vol.7 No.8, pp.1176 - 1190

Published online: 02 Oct 2007 *

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