The effect of governance mechanisms on the quality of risk disclosure: using bootstrap techniques Online publication date: Sat, 11-Oct-2014
by Gehan A. Mousa; Elsayed A.H. Elamir
American J. of Finance and Accounting (AJFA), Vol. 3, No. 2/3/4, 2014
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of six corporate governance mechanisms (institutional investors, foreign investors, major investors, debt ratio, board size and board composition) on the quality of corporate risk disclosure. The study uses a sample of listed firms in the Bahraini capital market and applies bootstrap techniques as a new method of statistical analysis. The findings show that institutional investors and major investors have a significant and positive effect on the quality of corporate risk disclosure. However, board size is found to have a significant and negative effect on corporate risk disclosure. Foreign investors, board composition and debt ratio are insignificant in relation to risk disclosure. The study suggests that the bootstrap techniques are a useful tool for the purpose of approximating the sampling distribution of a statistical analysis for which the sample size is small and offers a considerable potential for modelling in complex problems.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the American J. of Finance and Accounting (AJFA):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook