Using re-voting to reduce the threat of coercion in elections
by Gerald V. Post
Electronic Government, an International Journal (EG), Vol. 7, No. 2, 2010

Abstract: Voter coercion, such as vote buying, has been minimised for decades with the private voting booth. Cellphone videos, absentee ballots, voter receipts and internet voting re-introduce the possibility of coercion because they are methods to prove a vote. This article presents a mathematical model of the voting process to show that giving voters the option to re-vote removes this proof because an observed vote is not necessarily final. Re-voting can also be used to spot threats such as viruses and Trojan horses that subvert voting machines. Re-voting mechanisms require cryptography techniques to separate user identifiers from votes cast, enabling the system to track votes by time without providing the specific identity of the user or the details of the vote cast. Mix-nets and homomorphic encryption provide the necessary tools.

Online publication date: Tue, 12-Jan-2010

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