Nuclear proliferation resistance: issues from technological and institutional viewpoints for the reconstruction of global security
by T. Sawada
Atoms for Peace: an International Journal (AFP), Vol. 1, No. 2/3, 2006
Abstract: The proliferation resistance of reactors and fuel cycles has been historically discussed and evaluated from the technological and institutional viewpoints since the 1940s. In particular, under the strong incentive of Carter's Administration in the USA, during the Cold War period, a number of studies were performed to establish the framework of evaluating the degree of nuclear proliferation resistance. Since the end of the Cold War, the structure of the world seems to be changing toward a New World order. However, the evaluation framework of proliferation and the concept of proliferation resistance have not been changed. Here the conventional evaluation of the proliferation resistance is shortly reviewed. Also, issues related to the weapon usability of reactor-grade plutonium are addressed. These give a key knowledge basis to reconstruct global security in the sense of nuclear non-proliferation under the ongoing transformation of the world order.
Online publication date: Sat, 15-Jul-2006
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