Retailer-led supply chain contract coordination with supplier group evaluation
by Liwei Liu; Luying Wang; Jingkun Wang
International Journal of Modelling in Operations Management (IJMOM), Vol. 7, No. 3, 2019

Abstract: With the expansion of the enterprise scale, the original single supplier model has gradually evolved into a supplier group model. The evaluation of the retailer by the supplier group will have a certain impact on the retailer's decision. At the same time, as the status of retailers increases, retailers gradually grasp the dominance of the supply chain and use their channel advantages to charge channel cost to suppliers. Therefore, it is necessary to study the coordination problem of the supply chain when there is a supplier group's evaluation of the retailer and the retailer is dominant. This paper establishes the supply chain coordination decision model under the stackelberg game model and finds that the wholesale price contract and the traditional revenue sharing contract cannot achieve the overall optimal supply chain.

Online publication date: Mon, 14-Oct-2019

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