Why there is a need to revise the Design Basis Threat concept Online publication date: Tue, 11-Jul-2006
by Sergiy Kondratov, Friedrich Steinhausler
International Journal of Nuclear Law (IJNUCL), Vol. 1, No. 2, 2006
Abstract: The terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 necessitated a review of the proven concept of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) for nuclear installations. It can be assumed that revised and upgraded DBT will result in costly technical solutions. Since infrastructure deficits and financial limitations in many countries have already limited the practical application of the DBT, the revised threat assessment is likely to worsen the current unsatisfactory situation. Therefore, a new realism in the use of the DBT concept is proposed based on a three-level approach. This will enable countries to tailor the design of their physical protection systems in accordance with their means by implementing either a minimum required security level protecting only against the most probable threat, or an intermediate protection level reflecting the newly introduced AHARA (As High As Reasonably Achievable) principle, or the optimum protection level based on an externally reviewed, fully comprehensive DBT.
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