The influence of asymmetric bargaining power, mutual hostages and task characteristics on the governance structure of cross-border technology alliances Online publication date: Tue, 05-May-2009
by Farok J. Contractor, James A. Woodley
International Journal of Technology Management (IJTM), Vol. 48, No. 3, 2009
Abstract: Most studies of governance modes in cross border technology alliances treat contractual alliance forms and equity joint ventures as substitutes. Our sample allows us to explore when firms are likely to adopt licensing agreements without equity arrangements, in contrast to hybrid alliances that use equity joint ventures and licensing agreements together. Findings for our data provide little support for often repeated – and yet seldom tested – hypothesis that equity joint ventures may be formed to serve as a 'mutual hostage' for alliance participants, because of the fear of partner opportunism and its consequences. Rather, our findings point more strongly in favour of equity-based alliances being formed when the primary technology holder has stronger bargaining power, when patents are of importance, and when the strategic objectives of the alliance envisage future technology transfers.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Technology Management (IJTM):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook