Title: The influence of asymmetric bargaining power, mutual hostages and task characteristics on the governance structure of cross-border technology alliances
Authors: Farok J. Contractor, James A. Woodley
Addresses: School of Business, Department of Global Business and Management, Rutgers University, 81 New Street, Newark, NJ 07102, USA. ' Anisfield School of Business, Ramapo College, 505 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, NJ 07430, USA
Abstract: Most studies of governance modes in cross border technology alliances treat contractual alliance forms and equity joint ventures as substitutes. Our sample allows us to explore when firms are likely to adopt licensing agreements without equity arrangements, in contrast to hybrid alliances that use equity joint ventures and licensing agreements together. Findings for our data provide little support for often repeated – and yet seldom tested – hypothesis that equity joint ventures may be formed to serve as a |mutual hostage| for alliance participants, because of the fear of partner opportunism and its consequences. Rather, our findings point more strongly in favour of equity-based alliances being formed when the primary technology holder has stronger bargaining power, when patents are of importance, and when the strategic objectives of the alliance envisage future technology transfers.
Keywords: international alliances; alliance governance choices; negotiations; bargaining power; mutual hostages; partnerships; strategic alliances; technology alliances; alliance governance structure; alliance negotiations; bargaining power; partner risk; cross-border alliances; asymmetric bargaining; licensing agreements; equity joint ventures; patents; technology transfer; technology management.
International Journal of Technology Management, 2009 Vol.48 No.3, pp.403 - 422
Available online: 05 May 2009 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article