A two-period dynamic game for a substitutable product inventory control problem Online publication date: Fri, 25-Jul-2014
by Genco Fas; Taner Bilgiç
International Journal of Inventory Research (IJIR), Vol. 2, No. 1/2, 2013
Abstract: We consider the equilibrium strategies for substitutable product inventory control systems with a random demand in a two-period stationary environment between two retailers. This stationary scenario can be viewed as a dynamic game in a duopoly setting. We formulate the single period game and extend it to the two-period dynamic game. We investigate the existence and uniqueness of the feedback Nash equilibrium with two periods to go. We also suggest a threshold inventory level with two periods to go below which the usual substitution effect on the equilibrium may not be observed. We prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium by imposing more structure on the density function of the demand.
Online publication date: Fri, 25-Jul-2014
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Inventory Research (IJIR):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email firstname.lastname@example.org