Predicting target selection by terrorists: a network analysis of the 2005 London underground attacks
by Ferenc Jordan
International Journal of Critical Infrastructures (IJCIS), Vol. 4, No. 1/2, 2008

Abstract: A vulnerability analysis of possible use in security studies is presented. The analysis of the London underground network suggests that the stations bombed on 7 July, 2005 may not have been chosen randomly. From the viewpoint of effectively disturbing the transport system, nearly the best choice was made out of roughly 3 million possible combinations for attacking three stations. By comparing the underground networks of London, Tokyo and Budapest, we discuss the vulnerability of their underground networks. It seems to be plausible that such calculations can be made by softwares used widely in social network analysis. The predictive power of network analysis can be helpful in setting priorities in defence.

Online publication date: Wed, 05-Dec-2007

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