Forthcoming and Online First Articles

International Journal of Family Business and Regional Development

International Journal of Family Business and Regional Development (IJFBRD)

Forthcoming articles have been peer-reviewed and accepted for publication but are pending final changes, are not yet published and may not appear here in their final order of publication until they are assigned to issues. Therefore, the content conforms to our standards but the presentation (e.g. typesetting and proof-reading) is not necessarily up to the Inderscience standard. Additionally, titles, authors, abstracts and keywords may change before publication. Articles will not be published until the final proofs are validated by their authors.

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International Journal of Family Business and Regional Development (2 papers in press)

Regular Issues

  • Founder-CEO compensation in Canada: rent extraction or optimal contracting?   Order a copy of this article
    by Yves Bozec, Jackie Di Vito 
    Abstract: This study compares the compensation of founder-CEOs to that of professional CEOs, based on two theoretical approaches, optimal contracting and managerial power. We argue and show that excess voting rights are a key determinant in understanding the level and composition of founder-CEO compensation. Our findings show that the compensation of founder-CEOs without excess voting rights is generally lower than that of professional CEOs. However, in the presence of excess voting rights, founder-CEOs grant themselves significantly higher risk-free cash-based compensation than what is granted to a professional CEO, thus supporting the managerial power hypothesis.
    Keywords: founder; CEO compensation; excess voting rights; corporate governance; family firms; agency theory; ownership; Canada.

  • The impact of ownership structure on the board compensation   Order a copy of this article
    by Ali Sohrabi, Rayeheh Khatami 
    Abstract: Regarding existing studies focused on corporate governance and firm performance in the literature review, ownership structure can be broadly categorised into three main pillars, including family, management, and institutional ownership. One of the ways to motivate managers and enhance firm performance leading to increased shareholder wealth, is to pay performance-based compensation. The present study aims to investigate the impact of family, management, and institutional ownership on the board compensation of selected companies in a non-western country. The methodological approach is based on a quantitative approach, with data from 67 family firms collected from 2013-2017. The results revealed that family ownership and management ownership have no significant effect on the board compensation of the selected firms. The current paper offers novel insights into the relationship between ownership structure and board compensation by examining listed firms in a non-western country which increases the understanding of corporate governance practices in such countries.
    Keywords: ownership structure; corporate governance; board compensation; family firms.