Forthcoming Articles

International Journal of Integrated Supply Management

International Journal of Integrated Supply Management (IJISM)

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International Journal of Integrated Supply Management (One paper in press)

Regular Issues

  • Low-carbon supply chain decisions under technology licensing: a game-theoretic model of delayed entry   Order a copy of this article
    by Kai Chen, Hongzhuan Chen 
    Abstract: This study develops a two-stage dynamic game model to explore manufacturers’ delayed entry (DE) strategies for supply chain decarbonisation under proprietary technology barriers, utilising technology licensing (TL) as the enabling mechanism. We find that suppliers consistently welcome and conditionally facilitate manufacturer entry, while manufacturers prefer higher post-entry low-carbon technology (LCT) investments. The entry decision operates within three regimes governed by fixed-cost thresholds: unconditional, conditional, and no-entry. In the conditional regime, the supplier’s LCT investment acts as a strategic signal calibrated to an emission threshold, creating a threshold-triggered equilibrium. Although TL incentivises suppliers to elevate LCT investment, it can trigger an under-investment effect, hindering decarbonisation and inducing efficiency losses. To resolve this dual problem, we design a bargaining-based coordination contract, achieving Pareto improvement. In summary, DE serves as a strategic catalyst for supply chain decarbonisation. Furthermore, the analysis provides managers with actionable guidance on when and how to implement this strategy.
    Keywords: delayed entry; low-carbon technology investment; technology licensing; under-investment; coordination contract.
    DOI: 10.1504/IJISM.2026.10081146
     

 

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