Authors: Yongxuan Sang; Zhongwen Li; Lili Zhang; Hai Jiang; Kuan-Ching Li
Addresses: Software Engineering College, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, China ' College of Information Science and Engineering, Chengdu University, China; Key Laboratory of Pattern Recognition and Intelligent Information Processing, Institutions of Higher Education of Sichuan Province, Chengdu University, China ' Institute of Information Engineering, Huanghe Science and Technology College, China ' Department of Computer Science, Arkansas State University, USA ' Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Providence University, Taiwan
Abstract: So far, most ring signature schemes rely on hard number theory problems, such as discrete logarithm, bilinear pairings and so on. Unfortunately, the above underlying number theory problems will be solvable in the post quantum era. Lattice-based cryptography is a hotspot of research recently, due to its implementation simplicity and provable security reductions. When the hash-and-sign signature scheme was constructed based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems, provably secure lattice-based ring signature schemes were finally constructed. However, the hash-and-sign ring signatures were rather inefficient (with megabytes long signatures). In this paper, we propose an alternative method for constructing lattice-based and identity-based ring signature scheme which does not use the hash-and-sign methodology. In the random oracle model, the proposed signature scheme based on the problem in general lattices is unforgeable and holds anonymity. Compared with the previous instantiations of the hash-and-sign ring signature schemes, the lengths of secret key, public key and signatures in the proposed scheme are much shorter. The signing algorithm is quite simple, with matrix-vector multiplications and rejection samplings.
Keywords: ring signature; lattice; rejection samplings; anonymity; unforgeable.
International Journal of Embedded Systems, 2019 Vol.11 No.3, pp.386 - 396
Received: 26 Jan 2018
Accepted: 18 Mar 2018
Published online: 23 Apr 2019 *