Title: A game theoretic model and a distributed admission control scheme for quality of service routing

Authors: Paolo Conforto; Francesco Delli Priscoli; Alessandro Di Giorgio; Lorenzo Ricciardi Celsi

Addresses: Thales Alenia Space, Via Saccomuro 24, 00131 Rome, Italy ' Dipartimento di Ingegneria Informatica, Automatica e Gestionale Antonio Ruberti, Università di Roma La Sapienza, via Ariosto 25, 00185 Roma, Italy ' Dipartimento di Ingegneria Informatica, Automatica e Gestionale Antonio Ruberti, Università di Roma La Sapienza, via Ariosto 25, 00185 Roma, Italy ' Dipartimento di Ingegneria Informatica, Automatica e Gestionale Antonio Ruberti, Università di Roma La Sapienza, via Ariosto 25, 00185 Roma, Italy

Abstract: In this paper, we present an innovative distributed quality of service routing scheme suitable to operate in networks of general topology implementing a Diff-Serv service model for QoS support. The proposed scheme is based on a game theoretic non-cooperative model which exploits, on the one hand, the topological information distributed within the network by the current (non-QoS) link-state and distance-vector routing protocols and, on the other hand, the QoS information locally available at the node where the forwarding process takes place. In order to guarantee the satisfaction of a stability condition at each node, a distributed admission control (DAC) scheme is proposed to jointly operate with the non-cooperative routing scheme. The DAC decides if a new flow can be accepted without violating the nodes' stability constraints and provides each node with cumulative information about the status of the network downstream from its outgoing links.

Keywords: distributed admission control; DAC; Diff-Serv; game theory; Nash equilibrium point; quality of service routing; QoS.

DOI: 10.1504/IJSCC.2018.095267

International Journal of Systems, Control and Communications, 2018 Vol.9 No.4, pp.338 - 368

Received: 18 Jul 2017
Accepted: 27 Feb 2018
Published online: 02 Oct 2018 *

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