Title: Reciprocity in trades: an experimental game approach

Authors: Antonios Avgeris; Achilleas Kontogeorgos; Panagiota Sergaki

Addresses: Department of Agricultural Economics, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Aristotle University Campus, 54636, Greece ' Department of Business Administration of Food and Agricultural Enterprises, University of Patras, G. Seferi 2, 30100, Agrinio, Greece ' Department of Agricultural Economics, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Aristotle University Campus, 54636, Greece

Abstract: The central idea of expected utility theory defines the way that individuals make decisions under emergency and risk situations. Instead of this, various field and lab studies of the last decades, indicate that this theory does not represent a realistic image of human behaviour. Therefore, experimental findings show that reciprocity constitutes, in many cases, the basic driving force of decision-making behaviour. In a few words, people are reciprocal if they repay kind and unkind actions, too. On the other hand, they are utility maximisers if they act rationally. So, on the basis of the above mentioned, this study aims to highlight the behavioural attitudes of individuals through the measuring of reciprocity. For this scope, two games of game theory (ultimatum and dictator) were practiced and interacted among undergraduate students under real circumstances and were produced reliable conclusions about the two kinds of economic people, homo economicus and homo reciprocans. The research reveals that people have reciprocal behaviour even if this sometimes drives in irrational behaviour according to the economic theory.

Keywords: dictator game; economic behaviour; experimental economics; game theory; homo reciprocans; homo economicus; reciprocity; ultimatum game.

DOI: 10.1504/IJSAMI.2017.090610

International Journal of Sustainable Agricultural Management and Informatics, 2017 Vol.3 No.4, pp.298 - 313

Received: 26 Aug 2017
Accepted: 18 Nov 2017

Published online: 23 Mar 2018 *

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