Authors: Shih-Kung Lai; Ching-Pin Chiu
Addresses: College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, 1239 Siping Road, Shanghai, 200092, China ' Department of Real Estate and Built Environment, National Taipei University, 151 University Road, San Xia District, New Taipei City, 23741, Taiwan
Abstract: Tit for Tat is normally conceived of as being a winner that enhances the personal well-being among interactive strategies in the setting of repeated prisoner's dilemma games. Here we prove deductively that, under some conditions, Tit for Tat also outperforms other commonly adopted strategies in terms of enhancing the social welfare, the total of the personal well-beings. The implication is that we might want to seek better interactive strategies, or policies, that contribute most not only to the personal well-being, but also to the social welfare as well. Explanations can be drawn from this analysis on why zoning of a land control measure gives rise to mixed use in urban development.
Keywords: game theory; Tit for Tat; TFT; prisoner's dilemma; policies; zoning.
International Journal of Society Systems Science, 2018 Vol.10 No.1, pp.1 - 15
Available online: 19 Jan 2018 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Free access Comment on this article