Title: Can the leniency program deter collusion in young competition jurisdiction of transition economy?
Authors: Gyuzel Yusupova
Addresses: Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, National Research University, Higher School of Economics (HSE), Myasnitskaya, 20, Moscow 101000, Russia
Abstract: The paper fills the gaps between the scale of application of leniency program (LP) almost in every competition jurisdiction in the world and the concentration of the effect assessment on developed countries only. An empirical assessment of LP introduced in Russia in 2007, under imperfect antimonopoly provisions on collusions showed the effects of the changes in the rules of antitrust enforcement on the behaviour of market participants. I test the hypotheses of the impact of LP enforcement on the characteristics of collusion (types of agreement, duration and number of participants). I show that the first version of LP in Russia (2007) made antitrust enforcement less effective and accordingly reduced collusion detection. However, the reform of LP in 2009 provided the positive results. Even in very imperfect institutional environment, the improved version of LP (2009) has impact on collusion participants: less stable collusions are destroyed and potential collusions do not appear.
Keywords: collusion; transition economy; competition jurisdiction; indicator of collusion sustainability; Federal Antimonopoly Service; FAS; enforcement of antitrust provisions against collusion; hard-core cartels; collusion duration; number of participants of collusion discoveries; leniency program; antitrust legislation in Russia.
International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies, 2017 Vol.10 No.4, pp.383 - 406
Available online: 04 Jan 2018 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article