Title: Receipt-freeness and coercion resistance in remote E-voting systems

Authors: Yefeng Ruan; Xukai Zou

Addresses: Department of Computer and Information Science, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA ' Department of Computer and Information Science, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA

Abstract: Remote electronic voting (E-voting) is a more convenient and efficient methodology when compared with traditional voting systems. It allows voters to vote for candidates remotely, however, remote E-voting systems have not yet been widely deployed in practical elections due to several potential security issues, such as vote-privacy, robustness and verifiability. Attackers' targets can be either voting machines or voters. In this paper, we mainly focus on three important security properties related to voters: receipt-freeness, vote-selling resistance, and voter-coercion resistance. In such scenarios, voters are willing or forced to cooperate with attackers. We provide a survey of existing remote E-voting systems, to see whether or not they are able to satisfy these three properties to avoid corresponding attacks. Furthermore, we identify and summarise what mechanisms they use in order to satisfy these three security properties.

Keywords: remote E-voting systems; receipt-freeness; vote-selling; coercion resistance.

DOI: 10.1504/IJSN.2017.083836

International Journal of Security and Networks, 2017 Vol.12 No.2, pp.120 - 133

Received: 16 Aug 2016
Accepted: 25 Oct 2016

Published online: 14 Apr 2017 *

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