Title: The political economy of deforestation when distributional interests matter - a dynamic approach
Authors: Riad M. Sultan
Addresses: Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Mauritius, Reduit, Mauritius
Abstract: Market and political forces are analysed in a two-sector political economy model as main determinants of deforestation and land conversion decisions. User groups involve in lobby and pressure activities to influence the decision maker to release land towards their specific sectors. The interaction is modelled as a cooperative bargaining process and the Nash solution corresponds to the political organisational equilibrium where the interests of all parties, including that of the decision maker are maximised. Using dynamic theory, the steady-state demand for forest land is derived, and the conclusion is that deforestation and land conversions are adjustment processes based on distributional interests, lobbying and the decision maker's self-interest motive, mainly to enhance the welfare of user groups.
Keywords: deforestation; political economy; interest groups; lobbying; cooperative games; Nash solution; market forces; land conversion; pressure groups; modelling; cooperative bargaining; forest land.
Asian Journal of Management Science and Applications, 2016 Vol.2 No.4, pp.317 - 337
Available online: 13 Mar 2017 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article