Title: Price and carbon emission decisions under pressures of consumer, regulator and competition

Authors: Yu Xiong; Jiaquan Yang; Yimeng Li

Addresses: School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China; Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK ' School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China ' School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China

Abstract: This paper examines the impacts of consumer environmental awareness, carbon emission tax and competition on the firms' economic and environmental performance. We find that both in the single-channel supply chain and dual-channel supply chain, the manufacturer in a 'clean' industry invests to reduce the amount of carbon emissions per unit of product produced actively; however, the manufacturer in a 'dirty' industry is expected to reject the environmental investment. The retailer is always better off with a higher consumer environmental awareness or a higher carbon emission tax in a 'clean' industry, but worse off in a 'dirty' industry. The manufacturer is better off with a higher consumer environmental awareness or a higher carbon emission tax if and only if she is in a 'dirty' industry and in the dual-channel supply chain. The numerical examples present the condition which secures Pareto gains after the manufacturer encroaches.

Keywords: consumer awareness; environmental awareness; carbon emissions; carbon tax; CO2; carbon dioxide; environmental investment; Stackelberg game; pricing decisions; consumer pressure; regulator pressure; competition pressure; firm performance; economic performance; environmental performance; supply chain management; SCM; emission reduction; dual-channel supply chains.

DOI: 10.1504/IJMTM.2016.075840

International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management, 2016 Vol.30 No.1/2, pp.87 - 115

Available online: 07 Apr 2016 *

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