Authors: Shin Sakaue; Koichi Yamaura; Toyoaki Washida
Addresses: Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies, Sophia University, 7-1 Kioicho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 102-8554, Japan ' Graduate School of International Environmental and Agricultural Science, Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology, 3-5-8 Saiwai-cho, Fuchu-shi, Tokyo 183-8509, Japan ' Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies, Sophia University, 7-1 Kioicho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 102-8554, Japan
Abstract: This article examines regional and sectoral impacts of climate change under international climate agreements for abating GHGs. Using the IAM with sub-global CO2 abatement games involving players from three regions (Japan, China and the USA), we obtain both non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. Simulated results indicate: 1) there is little discrepancy between future temperature solutions if each region responds selfishly when reducing CO2 emissions; 2) cooperation between all game participants sees an increase in GDP, whilst non-participant regions suffer greater damage; 3) all sectors in participant countries increase in value-added, with other regions experiencing higher damages for most sectors under cooperation than under the scenarios proposed by the international community.
Keywords: EMEDA; integrated assessment model; IAMs; CGE models; computable general equilibrium; global warming; climate change; non-cooperative games; bargaining games; Nash equilibrium; Nash bargaining solution; NBS; regional impacts; sectoral impacts; international climate agreements; Japan; China; USA; United States; simulation; GHGs; greenhouse gases; cooperation; value added; CO2; carbon dioxide; carbon emissions; selfish behaviour; modelling.
International Journal of Global Warming, 2015 Vol.8 No.4, pp.463 - 500
Available online: 16 Nov 2015 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article