Authors: Rongyao He; Zhongkai Xiong; Yu Xiong
Addresses: School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, No. 174 Shazhengjie, Shapingba, Chongqing, China ' School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, No. 174 Shazhengjie, Shapingba, Chongqing, China ' Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate an assemble-to-order supply chain including a manufacturer and two complementary suppliers, one produces component associated with traditional quality while the other produces component associated with environmental quality of the manufacturer's product. In response to consumers' demand over enhancing product's both quality levels, the manufacturer may collaborate with component suppliers to enhance quality design. Four model cases are considered: collaboration between the manufacturer and either supplier over associated quality design, collaboration between the manufacturer and both suppliers over quality design, or no collaboration. Particularly, we focus on the impact of governmental taxes over production emissions of firms. In response to the coercive governmental penalty, firms will invest in greener production to reduce emissions. We compare suppliers' quality design, all firms' emission reduction levels, profits as well as the total net impact on environment under the four model cases and how these equilibriums will be affected by governmental taxation and how firms should choose collaboration model. [Received 13 July 2013; Revised 16 December 2013; Revised 28 March 2014; Accepted 20 April 2014]
Keywords: supply chain collaboration; environmental quality design; traditional quality design; emissions taxation; production emissions reduction; game theory; supply chain management; SCM; green production; assemble-to-order; ATO; government taxes.
European Journal of Industrial Engineering, 2015 Vol.9 No.4, pp.470 - 511
Received: 08 May 2021
Accepted: 12 May 2021
Published online: 02 Jul 2015 *