Title: Evolution of cooperation in the regional environmental governance with institutional reward

Authors: Minmin Teng; Chuanfeng Han

Addresses: School of Economics and Management, Institute of Urban Construction and Emergency Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804, China ' School of Economics and Management, Institute of Urban Construction and Emergency Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804, China

Abstract: The public goods game is extended with the assumption that increasing participation leads to increasing reward to promote cooperation in the regional environmental governance. This model constitutes a generalisation of the N-person prisoners' dilemma, and we study the infinite population case. The replicator dynamics reveals the existence of regimes in which two internal fixed points appear simultaneously, which is similar with that of N-person stag hunt evolutionary game. It is shown that the one at the lower frequency of cooperators is unstable, determining the threshold for cooperative collective action, while the one at the higher frequency is stable, determining the final frequency of cooperators in the population. Moreover, larger scale groups make the cooperation more difficult.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; cooperation; regional governance; environmental governance; evolutionary dynamics; institutional rewards; cooperative action; collective action.

DOI: 10.1504/IJCSM.2015.069740

International Journal of Computing Science and Mathematics, 2015 Vol.6 No.3, pp.232 - 240

Available online: 28 May 2015 *

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