Authors: Mouez Fodha
Addresses: LEO, University of Orleans, France; Paris School of Economics, Université d'Orléans, Faculté de Droit-Economie-Gestion, Rue de Blois, BP 26739, 45067 Orleans Cedex 2, France
Abstract: This article analyses the long-term consequences of nuclear waste storage within a general equilibrium framework. The objective is to determine the conditions for which the storage of waste, and thus the transfer of externalities towards the future, can be optimal. These conditions could explain the implementation of intergenerational externalities, justifying an intertemporal Not in My Back Yard behaviour. We first show that the choice of the policy instruments determines the feasibility of the storage policy. Indeed, economic stability imposes precise levels of the rate of storage or of the tax rate, making it possible to avoid chaotic economic dynamics. Under these specific conditions, and depending on the period at which an accident may occur and on the value of the social discount rate, we show that storing all the nuclear waste may be optimal.
Keywords: overlapping generations model; nuclear waste; environmental externalities; waste storage; nuclear energy; nuclear power; NIMBY; policy instruments; storage policy.
International Journal of Sustainable Development, 2015 Vol.18 No.1/2, pp.94 - 114
Received: 04 Apr 2013
Accepted: 14 Feb 2014
Published online: 06 Jan 2015 *