Title: Game theoretical models of two-level supply chain with a strategic consumer
Authors: Xu Zhang; Panlop Zeephongsekul
Addresses: School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences, RMIT University, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, VIC 3001, Australia ' School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences, RMIT University, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, VIC 3001, Australia
Abstract: In this paper, we look at several game theoretical models of a supplier-retailer supply chain involving a strategic consumer. The interaction between the players will be investigated using a leader-follower type game known as a Stackelberg game. Two scenarios are considered: 1) no coalition is formed among the players and they act non-cooperatively against each others; 2) a selection of two players form a coalition against the third player. Under the first scenario, we let each player takes turn as leader, and in the second scenario, the coalition takes the leadership position in the game. The effects due to leadership and coalition formation on each player's strategy and profit, especially consumer's welfare, will be investigated and numerical examples provided.
Keywords: two-level supply chains; symmetric information patterns; consumer welfare; leadership; coalition formation; Stackelberg game; game theory; supply chain management; SCM; strategic consumers; leader-follower games.
International Journal of Inventory Research, 2013 Vol.2 No.1/2, pp.4 - 26
Published online: 25 Jul 2014 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article