Title: Factors related to informal payments in public procurement in Russia
Authors: Alexandra Bashina
Addresses: Subdepartment of Mathematical Economics and Econometrics, Department of Applied Economics, Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Room 4330, 26, Shabolovka str., Moscow 119049, Russia
Abstract: It is known that anticorruption measures do not significantly reduce the corruption of state employees in Russia. The goal of this research is to analyse factors that influence the level of bribery in public procurement. The investigation is based on data from two surveys. The first was conducted by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the National Research University - Higher School of Economics. The second is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. We use binary response, ordered logit models and probit models with sample selection in this paper. Our econometric study demonstrates that incentives to bribe are higher in sectors with strong competition. Holding company members and the companies owned by the state are less involved in bribery than are private firms. The probability of bribery increases if unpredictable government regulation and political instability heavily influence enterprise performance.
Keywords: public procurement; bribery; economic policy; Russia; informal payments; state employees; incentives to bribe; unpredictable regulation; government regulation; political instability; firm performance.
International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies, 2013 Vol.6 No.4, pp.403 - 430
Published online: 28 Jun 2014 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article