Title: The insurance effect of IPO underpricing on litigation risk revisit: a discussion of instrumental variables

Authors: Yun Zhu

Addresses: Department of Accounting and Finance, School of Business Administration, Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309, USA

Abstract: The litigation risk hypothesis of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing suggests that issuers underprice IPOs in an effort to avoid costly litigation, and, therefore, that underpricing should be greater for issuers with ex-ante higher levels of litigation risk. Using passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 and lawsuit growth rate as instrumental variables, we find that the reported systematic link between litigation risk and IPO underpricing no longer exists in the sample of either traditional IPO cases or IPO allocation cases. Furthermore, we illustrate that the previously found significant relationship between these two is not persistent but rather is driven primarily by the choice of the instrumental variable.

Keywords: underpricing; litigation risk; initial public offering; USA; United States; private securities; litigation reform; statutory acts; legislation; laws; statutes; insurance effects; instrumental variables; litigation avoidance; issuers; ex-ante levels; lawsuits; systematic links; IPO allocation; case law; business innovation; business research.

DOI: 10.1504/IJBIR.2012.047277

International Journal of Business Innovation and Research, 2012 Vol.6 No.4, pp.458 - 479

Published online: 12 Dec 2014 *

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