Title: The existence of optimal copyright fee of indefinitely renewable copyright
Authors: Michael Y. Yuan
Addresses: Gabelli School of Business, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI 02809, USA
Abstract: Copyright fee is the new main policy variable to be set by copyright authority under indefinitely renewable copyright (IRC) proposed by Landes and Posner (2003). This study models and simulates IRC based on a market of information products with a monopolistically competitive creative industry. It shows that optimal copyright fee leading to maximal social welfare under such a copyright system can exist and that the availability of original information products decreases with copyright fee monotonically.
Keywords: indefinitely renewable copyright; IRC; optimal copyright fee; information availability; original information; social welfare; copyright fees.
DOI: 10.1504/IJSSS.2012.046992
International Journal of Society Systems Science, 2012 Vol.4 No.2, pp.167 - 185
Published online: 30 Aug 2014 *
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