Title: Electronic voting with Scantegrity: analysis and exposing a vulnerability
Authors: John S. Dean
Addresses: Department of Computer Science, Information Systems, and Mathematics, Park University, 8700 N.W. River Park Drive, Parkville, MO 64152, USA
Abstract: This paper describes Scantegrity, an electronic voting system developed by Chaum et al. (2008b), and it analyses Scantegrity|s ability to satisfy the goals of privacy and verifiability. The paper describes a programmatic attack on Scantegrity and presents findings in the form of program output for a corrupted hypothetical election. The attack takes advantage of the inherent vulnerability of electronic voting systems due to the tension between the goals of privacy and verifiability. It exposes a security weakness in electronic voting systems, and it establishes the need to control code compilation and provide physical security for that compiled code throughout the election process.
Keywords: Scantegrity; e-government; e-voting; mix network; RPC; randomised partial checking; attacks; electronic government; electronic voting; online voting; privacy; verifiability; vulnerability; election corruption; election fraud; security.
Electronic Government, an International Journal, 2012 Vol.9 No.1, pp.27 - 45
Published online: 22 Nov 2014 *
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