Article: Executive stock options and corporate report disclosures: managerial power and outrage costs perspectives Journal: International Journal of Economics and Accounting (IJEA) 2011 Vol.2 No.2 pp.145 - 172 Abstract: This study examines annual report disclosures of executive stock option(s) (ESOs) values by Australian listed companies for periods ending 2002 and 2003. This period was a |one-time| window of opportunity in which the Australian regulations for disclosing option values in financial statements were unclear, thus allowing preparers some latitude in the application of pricing regimes for the purpose of disclosure. The study further investigates the relation between reported option values and factors known to influence option valuations. Given the growing public concerns regarding director|s excessive compensation schemes and the governance of enterprises generally, this study provides evidence that directors have incentives to underreport the value of executive options. The evidence suggests that not only do directors have the power to award themselves excessive compensation, but also the mechanisms to camouflage excessive remuneration to avoid stakeholder dissent. This is the first known Australian study that examines option valuations in the context of managerial power and outrage cost theories. Inderscience Publishers - linking academia, business and industry through research

Title: Executive stock options and corporate report disclosures: managerial power and outrage costs perspectives

Authors: Elisha J. Kelly, Nicholas A. Mroczkowski

Addresses: Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology, John St., Hawthorn, Victoria 3122, Australia. ' Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology, John St., Hawthorn, Victoria 3122, Australia

Abstract: This study examines annual report disclosures of executive stock option(s) (ESOs) values by Australian listed companies for periods ending 2002 and 2003. This period was a |one-time| window of opportunity in which the Australian regulations for disclosing option values in financial statements were unclear, thus allowing preparers some latitude in the application of pricing regimes for the purpose of disclosure. The study further investigates the relation between reported option values and factors known to influence option valuations. Given the growing public concerns regarding director|s excessive compensation schemes and the governance of enterprises generally, this study provides evidence that directors have incentives to underreport the value of executive options. The evidence suggests that not only do directors have the power to award themselves excessive compensation, but also the mechanisms to camouflage excessive remuneration to avoid stakeholder dissent. This is the first known Australian study that examines option valuations in the context of managerial power and outrage cost theories.

Keywords: executive stock options; ESOs; option valuation models; agency theory; managerial power theory; outrage theory; annual reports; financial disclosure; Australia; option values; financial statements; director compensation schemes; excessive remuneration.

DOI: 10.1504/IJEA.2011.040112

International Journal of Economics and Accounting, 2011 Vol.2 No.2, pp.145 - 172

Published online: 21 Oct 2014 *

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Title: Executive stock options and corporate report disclosures: managerial power and outrage costs perspectives

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