Title: Contractual complexity, governance and organisational form in alliances

Authors: Jochen Schweitzer, Siegfried P. Gudergan

Addresses: Faculty of Business, University of Technology, Sydney, City Campus Haymarket, P.O. Box 123 Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia. ' Faculty of Business, University of Technology, Sydney, City Campus Haymarket, P.O. Box 123 Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia

Abstract: Contracting and governance related issues are critical for the success of alliances. In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to describe the role of the contractual complexity of alliance agreements for the governance and organisational form of alliances. We suggest control theory to explain how the goal incongruence and performance ambiguity among collaborating partners, in conjunction with the complexity of their contractual agreements, affect the organisational form of alliances that can be characterised as bureaucracy, market, clan, or adhocracy. Our framework implies that managers who review and control contractual complexity, goal incongruence, and performance ambiguity, will be able to identify and employ governance for their alliances that better supports their firm|s strategic intentions.

Keywords: contractual complexity; governance; organisational form; strategic business alliances; control theory; goal incongruence; performance ambiguity; alliance agreements.

DOI: 10.1504/IJSBA.2011.038132

International Journal of Strategic Business Alliances, 2011 Vol.2 No.1/2, pp.26 - 40

Available online: 18 Jan 2011 *

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