Title: Temporised equilibria: a rational concept of fairness into game theory

Authors: Riccardo Alberti

Addresses: Itatel S.p.a., Via Reiss Romoli – Localita Castelletto, 20019 Settimo Milanese (MI), Italy

Abstract: This paper introduces a paradigm for the resolution of a particular class of games (K) within Game Theory and develops mathematical methods for the analysis of conflicting situations in which the contenders share a finite series of measurable information. Classical equilibria schemes do not contemplate the presence of a symmetric and incomplete perturbative element in the games, leaving out a study case of enormous interest. The main result is the demonstration of the existence of the temporised equilibrium for every K-game and, in particular, the solution properties in symmetric games, with references to the geometrical structure of the proposed argumentation.

Keywords: temporised equilibria; fairness; game theory; K-game; judge; deterrent; mathematics; scalar parametric function; Nash equilibria; prisoner|s dilemma; non-zero-sum games; mobile ad-hoc networks; MANETs; mobile networks; symmetric games.

DOI: 10.1504/IJCSM.2010.037444

International Journal of Computing Science and Mathematics, 2010 Vol.3 No.3, pp.196 - 210

Published online: 13 Dec 2010 *

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