Title: Enhanced McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key exchange protocols with master key forward security
Authors: H. Guo, Y. Mu, X.Y. Zhang, Z.J. Li
Addresses: School of Computer Science and Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100083, PR China. ' School of Computer Science Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. ' Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou 450002, PR China. ' School of Computer Science and Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100083, PR China
Abstract: Master key forward security is an important property for identity-based key exchange protocols. Unfortunately, most of existing identity-based key exchange protocols do not satisfy this property. In this paper, we firstly analyse Xie|s modified protocol to show that signature is undesirable for an identity-based key agreement protocol with the master key forward secrecy. Then we present two improved protocols from McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key agreement protocol to capture the master key forward security. Our first protocol is efficient and its security can be proved with the help of a decisional oracle, while the second one achieves stronger security and its security can be reduced to a computational problem in the random oracle model. The master key forward secrecy is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Keywords: authenticated key exchange; master key forward secrecy; identity-based key agreement; provable security; identity-based cryptography.
International Journal of Security and Networks, 2010 Vol.5 No.2/3, pp.173 - 187
Available online: 17 Mar 2010 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article