Title: R&D partnership contract coordination of information goods supply chain in government subsidy
Authors: Rong Wang, Jian-Hua Ji, X.G. Ming
Addresses: Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200052, P.R. China. ' Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200052, P.R. China. ' Computer Integrated Manufacturing Institute, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, P.R. China
Abstract: Information goods supply chain partnership is the contract relationship of co-opetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuf, 1996) innovation in nature. The main findings are as following: in the threat of strategic substituting from industrial competitor of information goods, the government subsidy policy for information goods supply chain makes up the lack of incentives to original innovation due to innovation externalities, improves information goods supply chain partners| incentives to cooperative innovation, reduces industrial competitor|s incentives to imitative innovation, and makes supply chain system profit of information goods and social welfare improvement in the incentive policy of government subsidies. The perfect sharing contract may achieve greater effective coordination than non-linear transfer payment contract, along with the strengthening of the innovation basis and the extent to which partners absorb and transform technological innovation knowledge, and the improvement of intellectual property protection environment and the degree of intellectual property protection.
Keywords: information goods supply chain; cooperative innovation; government subsidy policy; nonlinear transfer payment contract; perfect sharing contract; supply chain partnership; contract relationship; co-opetition; government subsidies; intellectual property protection; R&D partnerships; contract coordination; research and development.
International Journal of Computer Applications in Technology, 2010 Vol.37 No.3/4, pp.297 - 306
Published online: 03 Mar 2010 *Full-text access for editors Full-text access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article