Title: An analysis of supply chain coordination in a multi-agent market

Authors: S. Dutta, S.P. Sarmah

Addresses: Proof and Experimental Establishment, DRDO, Chandipur 756025, India. ' Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, IIT, Kharagpur 721302, India

Abstract: This paper uses a coalitional game to model the market-based matching resulting from the negotiation mechanism of supply chain contracting in a completely informed multi-agent market that satisfies the condition of Individual Rationality (IR). Hence the most inefficient and the ex post efficient allocation patterns of market-based matching are identified. Further the Pareto efficient market-based matching that extracts the maximum overall market efficiency is found to be coincidental with the core of the game that exists. Identifying the distinction between the notions of ex post efficiency and Pareto efficiency in this setting, the dynamics of Pareto improvements of allocation patterns is analysed.

Keywords: multi-agent markets; ex post efficiency; Nash equilibrium; supply chain intermediaries; individual rationality; supply chain contracting; Pareto efficiency; coalitional game; supply chain coordination; supply chain management; SCM; modelling; negotiation mechanisms.

DOI: 10.1504/IJOR.2009.027154

International Journal of Operational Research, 2009 Vol.6 No.4, pp.475 - 499

Published online: 16 Jul 2009 *

Full-text access for editors Full-text access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article