Title: One-round key exchange in the standard model

Authors: Colin Boyd, Yvonne Cliff, Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto, Kenneth G. Paterson

Addresses: Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434 Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia. ' Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434 Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia. ' Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434 Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia. ' Information Security Group, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK

Abstract: We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the Random Oracle Model.

Keywords: authentication protocols; key exchange; standard model; security analysis; cryptography; key encapsulation mechanisms; KEM.

DOI: 10.1504/IJACT.2009.023466

International Journal of Applied Cryptography, 2009 Vol.1 No.3, pp.181 - 199

Available online: 24 Feb 2009 *

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