Title: Individual incentives in supervised work groups: from human subject experiments to agent based simulation
Authors: Arianna Dal Forno, Ugo Merlone
Addresses: Department of Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Piazza Arbarello, 8 I-10122 Torino, Italy. ' Department of Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Piazza Arbarello, 8 I-10122 Torino, Italy
Abstract: We consider a model of work group interaction and introduce an incentive scheme in order to prevent dissatisfaction in subordinates. Several behaviours, which are grounded on observing human subjects when interacting in a similar task, are implemented in artificial agents and simulated. Our results shed light on some aspects of interaction between individuals in complex environment and economic performance, and give insights in terms of observation of the performance measures in organisations.
Keywords: agent behaviour; experiments; bounded rationality; incentives; grounded theory; equity theory; supervised work groups; work group interaction; subordinates; worker dissatisfaction; agent-based simulation; performance measures.
International Journal of Internet and Enterprise Management, 2009 Vol.6 No.1, pp.4 - 22
Available online: 04 Feb 2009 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article