Title: Democracy and exchange rate regime choice

Authors: J. Russell

Addresses: John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ 07079, USA

Abstract: This paper takes a new look at the relationship between democracy and exchange rate regimes. Evidence from a cluster analysis and a panel analysis suggests that democracies are not all equally likely to float their exchange rates. While democracies are more likely to float than autocracies are, established democracies are more likely to choose a fixed exchange rate regime because they are better able than transition democracies to make the credible commitments needed for a cooperative arrangement. More established democracies are more able to join cooperative arrangements that allow them to make a less constrained choice between floating and fixing.

Keywords: democracy; transition democracies; exchange rates; cluster analysis; transition economies.

DOI: 10.1504/IJTGM.2008.021396

International Journal of Trade and Global Markets, 2008 Vol.1 No.4, pp.339 - 354

Published online: 22 Nov 2008 *

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