Title: Competing for criminal money

Authors: Brigitte Unger, Gregory Rawlings

Addresses: Utrecht School of Economics, Janskerkhof 12, 3512 BL Utrecht, The Netherlands. ' Department of Anthropology, Gender & Sociology, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand

Abstract: To compete for criminal money by means of high levels of bank secrecy has been a tempting strategy for countries to attract globally mobile funds. We show in a model that this |Seychelles strategy| can increase national output, in particular, if a country takes first movement leadership in the competition game. If all countries try to do the same, there will be a race to the bottom and a supranational authority like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) must intervene. However, there are also some intrinsic barriers to the Seychelles strategy. Among others, criminal capital might crowd out legal capital and money laundering might increase crime. Our findings suggest that countries have created niches for money laundering. Small countries can free ride for a while, but will eventually face external sanctions and internal crime problems.

Keywords: money laundering; tax competition; Cournot-Nash game; multiplier; blacklisting; criminal finance; offshore finance centres; tax havens; globalisation; transnational crime; bank secrecy; Seychelles strategy.

DOI: 10.1504/GBER.2008.019987

Global Business and Economics Review, 2008 Vol.10 No.3, pp.331 - 352

Published online: 20 Aug 2008 *

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